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Prologue: On The Contradiction of Liberal Capitalism 
Theories of social class, so Fredric Jameson described at the time, appeared 
to be on the wane, and far less important, than theories of authoritarianism, racism, 
and sexism in the aftermath of the postmodern turn. This was at the height of the 
social welfare period in the 1960s, and during the earliest forgings of the postmodern 
cultural revolution that would lead into the 1980s and 1990s – the decades that saw 
the rise of neoliberalism and the defeat of European Communism. During a moment 
of class compromise between capital and labour, it appeared then that a class 
politics, not to mention the agency of the working class as a revolutionary subject, 
lacked any seriously threatening gesture to the established order. As the Soviet 
Union veered towards collapse and ultimate demise, the practical project of 
Communism, too, seemed to have finally been plunged into the dustbin of history. 
Yet, as Jameson suggests, this retreat from class was far more misleading than it 
appeared. Although they are structured as radical movements, the demands for 
greater equality and social justice stemming from feminist, anti-racist, post-
colonialist, anti-imperialist, and other similar movements (including, for instance, the 
student movement) lack any substantive and intrinsic subversive thrust weighed 
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against the power of capital. As Jameson puts it, “the slogans for populism and the 
ideals of racial justice and sexual equality were already themselves part and parcel 
of the Enlightenment itself, inherent not only in a socialist denunciation of capitalism, 
but even and also in the bourgeois revolution against the ancien régime.”1 The values 
for equality and social justice espoused by these movements, as we see in 
consumer culture, are very easily diffusible and co-optable by capitalism and 
capitalist ideology, itself. The liberal ideology, in fact, has an interest in equality and 
social justice to the extent that these are the internal measures of its own success. 
Nevertheless, it is the actual existence of the social symptom – the exploited – that 
contradicts even the fantasy and desire for equality present in the liberal ideology, if 
not necessarily within the capitalist mode of production.  
The significance of the Marxist position has thus been to highlight and identify 
the contradiction at the heart of the relationship between the liberal ideology and the 
capitalist mode of production. This is a relationship that is not merely arbitrary since 
liberalism and the liberal legal discourse creates the very conditions of possibility for 
the development of the capitalist mode of production insofar as it sanctions a 
specific conception of property, creates and defends (both through the legal or 
ideological apparatus, and the repressive apparatus of the state) the space of the 
market as the setting in which freedom and equality may be actualized, and backs 
the value of the national state’s currency, which becomes the primary means of 
reifying and measuring human equality in the form of value represented by the 
money commodity and the wage in the market.2 The latter helps us to grasp the 
correlated and parallel developments in modernity of commodity fetishism, 
citizenship, and the rise of the liberal subject.3 But if we examine the relationship 
between the liberal ideology and the capitalist mode of production more closely – 
that is, to think the contradiction between the political and the economic, and not just 
as a substantive “political economy” – then we might be able to see just where the 
demands contained in the social justice movements of the past and the present, set 
within global capitalism, come up to and are sustained by an erroneous opposition 
and a disavowed relation to their desire. 
The problem with the liberal ideology has nothing to do with its demands and 
expectations, nor even with its own measuring stick of legal formalistic equality and 
social justice. Its problems stem from its own inability to grasp and apprehend the 
fact for the necessity of inequality contained within capitalist practices of exploitation. 
We do not have to go through the entire plot of Marx’s Capital at this point to 
acknowledge his dialectical revelation of exploited wage labour as the source of 
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surplus value; but we do need to be reminded that a system of value production 
based upon exploitation does indeed require and necessitate the reproduction of 
inequality in order to do so. We might reflect, as well, on the fact that capital 
produces a number of its own internal contradictions, not least of which is that 
between the fact of exploitation and its historically unprecedented levels of 
productivity and development. In fact, this last point indicates something about the 
motor of capitalism and the historical unfurling of its own revolutionary capacities. As 
a system, capitalism begins with its own first principle: production geared towards 
the accumulation of profit. In order to actualize this principle, it is constantly in need 
of self-revolutionizing and even at times undermines itself in order to go on pursuing 
ever expanding profits. This is one reason why Deleuze and Guattari’s categories of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization make sense materially: capital must 
constantly engage in a process of deterritorializing itself in order to reterritorialize in 
heightened forms of productivity and accumulation. This also explains why, over the 
course of its history, we see that capitalism advances developments in science and 
technology, and the standard quality of living. It can do all of this, but since it 
depends upon, for its own existence, its first principle of profit accumulation, it is 
internally incapable of realizing the demands for equality and social justice 
proclaimed by liberal idealism. 
The liberal ideology is thus at a crossroads that even, in our present context, in 
twenty-first century neoliberal capitalism (not to mention the strengthening forces of 
the reactionary right and new nationalist movements on the global stage), demands 
attention and consideration. If we are to take liberalism at its word, that it desires the 
concrete expansion of equality, then we need to discover that which is within 
liberalism that needs to be preserved and that which we need to negate in order for 
it to realize these goals; and, by doing so, question whether or not the desire for 
greater equality and social justice justifies the negation of the liberal legal system, 
which was in fact the progenitor of these very demands. Liberal modernity, as Hegel 
claimed, was indeed the “end of history,” insofar as it established the categories of 
universal freedom and equality as ideals unto themselves. What makes liberal 
modernity contradictory is that it undermines, itself, these very goals that it sought to 
have realized, which is why Adorno and Horkheimer or not entirely wrong with their 
thesis on the dialectic of enlightenment.  
Apart from this, we need to also recognize the significance of the modern 
national states and the role that they have played in interpellating subjects compliant 
in the capitalist mode of production, and even at the level of the contradictions at 
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play between the liberal ideology – demanding universal equality and social justice – 
and the nationalist ideology demanding an identification of subjects with the 
particularity of their culture, which in fact is a key motivation in the reproduction of 
xenophobia and racism, which help to legitimize and facilitate the systemic forms of 
inequality required by capital caught in international competition and inter-imperialist 
rivalry. Cutting to the chase, my point is that the contradiction between liberalism and 
capitalism is very much at the centre of our present historical conundrum, faced still 
with the crises of both, that we can periodize towards the event of the 2008 financial 
crisis and the various competing interpellations today, from nationalism to liberalism, 
and perhaps even beyond.  
It is already cliché for Žižek scholars to cite his unidentifiable reference to 
Walter Benjamin’s claim that every rise of fascism bears witness to a failed Left 
revolution.4 Nevertheless, this statement suffices to explain in part the current rise in 
popularity of reactionary nationalist movements around the world. Since national 
identities have enjoyed a prior stability in the centuries of rising capitalism – where a 
national identity was needed to help grow the national economies of capitalist states 
– they appear to have become a comfortable fallback position (not, of course, unlike 
the patriarchies of both the bourgeois household and the conjugal family in the 
nineteenth century, and the nuclear family of the mid-twentieth one) in the wake of 
the crisis, where Leftist concepts and interpellations seem to be having a more 
tumultuous and precarious rate of success.  
The academic Left, over the course of the past fifteen years or so, and 
particularly since the 2008 crisis, has dabbled somewhat in a return to the idea of 
Communism. This has been a project given voice by a number of leading intellectual 
figures on the Left, including Alain Badiou, Jodi Dean, Bruno Bosteels, Antonio Negri, 
and Slavoj Žižek.5 However, given the history and failure of twentieth-century 
Communism, and even the idea apparent in Marx – or perhaps, more so, in Marxist 
literature – that Communism is meant to represent a resolution of all previous 
historical contradictions – an idea expressed early on, even, in The Communist 
Manifesto – we should ask whether we can we still expect the idea, or the concept of 
Communism to be adequate to the task of interpellating an emancipatory 
consciousness, one that does not retreat into the reactionary particularities of the 
new nationalisms and chauvinisms. This, according to Todd McGowan, in his book, 
Emancipation After Hegel: Achieving a Contradictory Emancipation, is not at all the 
case.6 His claim, instead – a claim that, as I intend now to explain, I find compelling if 
only to bring to fruition the underlying political goals of Marxism – is that Hegel, much 
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more so than Marx and the idea of Communism, offers us a far more profound 
theory of universal emancipation today.  
In what follows, I aim to draw out McGowan’s theory of universal 
emancipation, expressed through his reading of Hegel, but I also attend to this theory 
to reflect upon the material conditions expressed by the contemporary forms of 
inequality and exploitation, and to question the relationship between the various 
particular political antagonisms in existence in our current situation, against the 
universality of the capitalist mode of exploitation. My goal, then, is to argue for the 
priority of capitalism as the totalizing condition of our political antagonisms, but not 
to the detriment of other existing antagonisms and contradictions. Quite the contrary, 
I argue that it is only by negating the determinative forces of global capitalism that 
we may begin to address at a higher level, other existing contradictions – not to 
resolve them, as McGowan warns, but to think them and to reason a positive 
formation for the actuality of freedom. 
 
Introduction: After Freud and Marx – Hegel for the Twenty-First Century  
 McGowan’s book on Hegel follows quite closely to his previous book, 
Capitalism and Desire.7 His thesis in that book concerns the overlap between the role 
of the obstacle in the capitalist mode of production (i.e., “The true barrier to capitalist 
production is capital itself”)8 and that of the subject in the psychic, libidinal register of 
desire. This is particularly the case when we consider how capitalism operates in its 
consumerist logic and within the space of the market since it is the lure of fantasy 
and desire that binds subjects in capitalism to the illusory satisfactions of 
commodities. McGowan argues that in capitalism our fantasies about particular 
commodities are propelled by the barrier or obstacle that forever prevents our 
access to enjoyment. What happens, then, is that we confuse our desire for the 
object barred by the obstacle (the Lacanian objet a), that is any and every particular 
commodity, with our desire for the obstacle, itself. We unknowingly desire the 
obstacle, according to McGowan, since it is only the obstacle that creates the 
conditions of possibility for the object. This is why McGowan tends to refer to the 
Lacanian objet a as a “lost object.” The object only exists insofar as it is lost, access to 
which we perceive as prevented by some obstacle or barrier, or even a figure of 
authority (like a parent or a dictator, or some figure of an enemy or intruder) who is 
barring our access. It is our pursuit of this lost object that simultaneously propels 
desire and ensconces us within the field of the capitalist relations of exploitation, like 
the dangling of the carrot in front of the horse.  
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Ideologically, capitalism works because of the central role played by 
commodity fetishism. Commodity fetishism creates the conditions of possibility for 
the entire capitalist mode of production, but it operates through a material and 
practical reification of belief into the particular object of the money commodity and 
the wage. While Marxists tend argue that the commodity conceals the positive 
network of social relations underlying capitalist production, the Lacanian approach 
has been more precise in showing that the commodity fetish conceals the very lack 
in social being, the antagonism or contradiction that forever prevents the possibility 
of a harmonious whole or resolution. The money commodity, in other words, 
operates as the focal point tying together the capitalist relations of production. It is an 
object into which we invest our beliefs so that we may go on, in other circumstances, 
acting as if we renounce our very belief in “metaphysical subtleties and theological 
niceties.”9 There is, in other words, a dimension of disavowal in commodity fetishism, 
whereby we are made capable of displacing our concentrated belief in the value of 
the money commodity, and our investment in it, with supra-human qualifications, so 
that we can otherwise act as secular humanist liberal subjects.10 The form of 
fetishism disavowal present within the capitalist relations of production therefore 
explains why, as Samo Tomšič puts it, capitalism “demands perversion from its 
subjects.”11 This is because, as Žižek notes, it disavows castration.12  
While agreeing with McGowan’s claim in Capitalism and Desire, that it is in 
fact the obstacle that the subject desires rather than the lost object that appears to 
be displaced by it, it seems to me that the argument there remains incomplete. If the 
structure of desire is one in which we desire the obstacle, and the analytical 
interpretation is one that is meant to bring awareness to this fact, what then are the 
conditions of possibility for emancipation from the capitalist investment in the 
commodity fetish, which seems very much capable of actualizing the psychic 
economy of the desiring subject?13 McGowan, as I see it, fills in these blanks with his 
book on Hegel. 
 Several key premises animate McGowan’s Hegelian theory of emancipation. 
First and foremost is the claim that Left Hegelians, and many of the twentieth century 
interpretations of Hegel miss out on some of his most radical insights because they 
either bypass or avoid Hegel’s writing, specifically, on Christianity and the state. In the 
split between the Left and Right Hegelians, the Left took the “good stuff,” as 
McGowan puts it, including dialectics and the historical development of subjectivity, 
while the Right took Christianity and the state (2). But as McGowan contends, the 
latter inform central tenets of Hegel’s dialectical theory of freedom. By ridding Hegel 
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of this apparent ideological baggage, the Left – and this includes many of the key 
figures in Western Marxism, including Lukács, Gramsci, Sartre, and the Frankfurt 
School – lost sight of integral dimensions of Hegel’s theoretical importance. Although, 
according to McGowan, Christianity is central to Hegel’s system, it is for him neither 
the religion of salvation nor that of divine provenance. The significance of Christianity, 
for Hegel, is instead the fact that it is, according to him, the first religion to reveal the 
divine as split – as a divided subject. Christianity, according to McGowan, shows that 
God suffers from the same contradictions as humans. Losing this insight, the Left 
Hegelians, including Marx, miss out on Hegel’s emancipatory reading of Christianity, 
in which the point is not to find reconciliation in the divine, but to bring attention to 
the fact that no substantial whole exists; that all being is ridden with contradictions. 
This last point informs the second major premise of McGowan’s reading of Hegel. 
The problem with Marxism and the idea of Communism, according to McGowan, is 
its vision of an emancipated future freed  from contradiction.  
What Hegel makes explicit is the fact that all being is fissured by contradiction. 
Coming to know and grasp, to apprehend, the fact of contradiction is, for McGowan, 
the key insight of Hegel’s philosophy. McGowan argues that every political attempt to 
move past, or eradicate, or transcend contradiction has ultimately resulted in failure, 
catastrophe, and tragedy, on both the Left and the Right. Fascism, on the one hand, 
gives rise to a particularity that avoids the universal present in the social symptom, 
which pronounces the existing contradictions within the political system. The anti-
Semitic figure of the Jew, for instance, expresses the universal background against 
which the particularity of the Nazi and Aryan project towards its own social harmony 
sets itself and misses in its very attempt to eradicate Jews from Europe. But likewise, 
McGowan sees European Communism and Stalinism as a Right-wing deviation from 
Hegel’s insights about contradiction as an ontological inevitability. Communism is, in 
other words, including Marx’s vision of it, according to McGowan, premised on the 
resolution of contradiction and as such results in a reversal of the goals it sets out to 
accomplish: universal emancipation. It’s here that Marxism goes too far, even, in 
avoiding Hegel’s interpretation of the emancipatory potentials of the state form. 
 The state, as we’ll see, plays a major role in Hegel’s theory of freedom. 
Although it is very difficult to avoid problems with the abuses of state power in 
modern history, and particularly its bourgeois form as a class state mechanism 
representing the interests of the capitalist class (which is why Marx likely favoured 
the idea of the withering away of the state), the state in McGowan’s reading of Hegel 
becomes a formal necessity in the realization of the potential towards freedom. The 
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state, or something akin to it, according to McGowan, “is necessary to rip subjects 
out of their attachment to the illusions of their private world.” As McGowan explains, it 
is through the state form, and its encounter with it, that “the subject recognizes the 
logical priority of its public being,” which is the positive and practical means through 
which it can apprehend its own freedom (5).  
For me, this view of the state is one of the most intriguing and pressing 
components of McGowan’s Hegelianism. His reading of the state helps to reconcile 
the gap in his prior critique of capital and the libidinal investment in the obstacle that 
capital finds capable of inscribing into itself. Moving from the investment in the 
commodity form towards an investment in the state form is for me, at least, one way 
of thinking the emancipation from capitalist practices of exploitation. As well, it’s a 
point worth highlighting at a moment when the Left, still, is enraptured by the old 
idea of the “withering away of the state,” often pronounced these days in radical calls 
for the elimination of borders.14 Apart from the practical dilemmas that this presents 
us with – not merely the challenge over wage declines (a hotly debated and 
contested issue), but also the practical mechanisms for the allocation of needs and 
resources (to satisfy medical needs, for instance); it is also worth pointing out the fact 
that the elimination of borders set within capitalism can only but support capitalist 
interests (free trade, for instance). This is a view that also appears still to take solace 
in the resolution of contradictions.  
I’d go further, still, in arguing that the emergence of the contemporary culture 
wars – between the so-called social justice warriors (a Right-wing slur for the Left) 
and the reactionary alt-Right – is a by-product of the avoidance of contradiction. That 
is, these new interpellations, these new forms of subjectivization, are the ideological 
result of avoiding the apprehension of contradiction, perhaps best rendered on the 
Leftish end of the spectrum by posthumanist, monist, and vitalist conceptions of 
subjectivity that seek to avoid dualism and contradiction all together.15 Even the 
category of the assemblage, or object oriented ontologies, appear to avoid the 
ontological inevitability of contradiction, preferring instead a utopian vision of a 
harmonious fluid relationship between the human and the non-human that dissolves 
entirely the separations between them, and what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 
“arborescent structures,”16 rendering the subject-object binary or dualism obsolete. 
The new subjects of twenty-first century capitalism, and their conceptualizations by 
new materialisms, posthumanisms, and accelerationisms, are just so many different 
avenues of avoiding the centrality of contradiction for moral reasons.  
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It is surely obvious, then, that I agree with this premise in McGowan’s reading 
of contradiction. However, I suggest that this view is evinced by a final implicit 
premise in his book, that the truth of Hegel has only become visible retroactively, in 
the aftermath of the twentieth century, and following the theoretical advances of 
Marx and Freud. McGowan states this explicitly with Freud by suggesting that he 
created “the theoretical apparatus that makes it possible to understand the radicality 
of Hegel’s project” (41). The problem with Hegel, according to McGowan, is that he 
came too soon and therefore lacked fully the “theoretical apparatus through which 
he could formulate the drive to sustain and extend contradictions” (40-41). It’s only 
with the arrival of psychoanalysis a century after Hegel that his project of 
“highlighting contradiction as the subject’s fundamental aim” could be articulated 
fully (41).  
McGowan explains that, according to psychoanalysis, “subjects are not driven 
to eliminate what destroys them and achieve harmony but to find a way to sustain 
the self-destruction” (41). Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, and the further 
development of his theories of fantasy, desire, and drive, particularly in the way that 
these have been elaborated by the work of Jacques Lacan, identifies the 
contradictions at the heart of subjectivity. Subjects viewed through the lens of 
psychoanalysis do not merely pursue pleasurable outcomes; they also garner 
enjoyment in the failure to achieve what they perceive to be pursuing, and therefore 
come to enjoy what might rationally be perceived as a painful experience. The 
language of psychoanalysis in this way helps to articulate and make more 
accessible what Hegel aims at with his conception of contradiction. It helps us to see 
how the subject pursues rather than flees from contradictions. But just as Freud, 
through his discovery and conception of the unconscious, troubles the bourgeois 
consciousness – Freud shows that the subject is never a fully self-aware, centred 
individual consciousness, therefore even ripping to shreds the legal-discursive 
conception of the subject of liberal capitalism, the private individual who is in pursuit 
of his rational self-interest – so too does Marx trouble the liberal conception of society 
and history by identifying the class struggle as its political engine.17 Class struggle, in 
other words, helps us to grasp the motor of history as one driven by antagonisms 
between shared collective consciousness rather than as the utilitarian acts of self-
interested individuals.  
Although McGowan credits Marx for his dialectical critique of capitalism, his 
critique of Marx’s political vision of a Communist resolution to contradiction seems to 
shade his appreciation for what historical materialism offers as a dialectical 
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interpretation of the practical contradictions of human material needs. McGowan is 
not wrong in championing Hegel’s vision of emancipation over Marx’s, especially 
given our actual historical experiences of it, but I would argue that it is only after the 
Marxist deviation (if we want to call it that) from the ontological priority of 
contradiction, and the political history of European Communism, fascism, and 
present contradictions of capitalism, that the revival of Hegel as an emancipatory 
figure is made possible in the way that McGowan aspires for him to be. Hegel, in 
other words, is only realized as a theorist of emancipation in McGowan’s reading 
after we have gone through Marx and Freud. It is by doing so that McGowan proves 
the need for us to stop being Marxists or Communists, or for us to stop naming our 
project as such, and to embrace a renewed reading of Hegel that allows us to 
develop an historical concept of universal emancipation adequate to our current 
needs and conditions. 
Through his reading of Hegel, McGowan provides a discourse and a theory of 
emancipation, revolutionary consciousness, and radical change that surpasses the 
limits of contemporary Marxisms, new materialisms, and posthumanisms. He 
develops a formal concept of love (through a reading of Hegel’s Christianity) and the 
state necessary for grasping and apprehending contradictions, not only of capital, 
but of being as such. Against the new materialists and posthumanists, he provides a 
characterization of the human subject capable of thinking, and not merely of 
understanding (or “witnessing”) contradiction, through reasoning and love; and 
against the neo-Communists – or maybe as a comradely nudge towards them – he 
provides a justification for the form of the state and the law as a means towards our 
freedom, one which flies in the face of the mantra of the withering away of the state, 
which I’d say, after all, is an idea replicated, at least rhetorically, in neoliberalism.  
Neoliberals argue for less government, all the while using the state apparatus 
more and more to discipline subjects and to build and regulate a market and market 
based ethics that only deepens inequality, constraint, and control. But for McGowan, 
the state can have emancipatory potential, that is if we see it as a means through 
which to grasp contradiction. It’s in this way that he offers a concept of emancipation 
that goes further than Communism as a resolution to all previous historical 
contradictions. McGowan, instead, reasons that contradictions cannot be eliminated, 
and every attempt to do so disavows their necessity and ends up reproducing 
tyranny. We can only come to see this, though, if we – as Žižek often suggests – 
begin by reversing Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, that the philosophers have 
only thought in many ways about the world, the point is to change. Instead, it is 
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necessary to think the world. Thinking, in fact, is precisely the way that Hegel helps 
us to single out human subjectivity as an ethical and distinct agent of freedom, 
separate from the non-human world. 
What I’d like now to elaborate upon are some of the insights that McGowan 
presents through his reading of Hegel, beginning with the implicit Lacanian reading 
of his theory of reason. But by going through this approach, and in thinking reason in 
the Lacanian register of the logics of sexuation, I want to move further in conceiving 
the contradiction between the particularity of the sexual (as well as racial and other) 
differences, and the universality of the global capitalist system. My goal, here, is to 
suggest that, regardless of how evidentiary the existence of these other particular 
contradictions may be, the path towards universal emancipation rests within our 
own historical approach to the totality of the capitalist system as the setting against 
which all other contradictions are positioned. Capitalism, in other words, is a primary 
contradiction, whereas others, like that between the advocates of open borders and 
populist anti-immigrants, as Žižek points out, are secondary contradictions.18 Reading 
these others against the universality of global capitalism is, for me, a way for us to 
discover the terms of our actual unfreedom and the perpetuation of inequality as 
then expressed in these various other particularities. In conclusion, I hope to show 
how McGowan’s assertion of the centrality of love and the state, as the positive 
manifestations of contradiction, help us to express the real potentials for universal 
emancipation in the times that lie ahead. Love and the state are what’s missing in the 
history of Western Marxism, but with Hegel, as he is read by McGowan, it is also with 
the advantage of the Lacanian analytical discourse, and its approach to the position 
of the subject vis-à-vis its enjoyment, that the realization of the Marxist goals for 
emancipation may be presented more clearly for us today. 
 
Part One: Reasoning Freedom 
Sexuation, Understanding, Reasoning 
McGowan’s reading of Hegel is modeled very closely on Lacanian frameworks, not 
least of which is Lacan’s logics of sexuation. This comes across in his discussion of 
reasoning and understanding. Reason, according to McGowan, is the highest form of 
thought for Hegel. It accomplishes what mere being cannot by thinking the 
contradiction. It is opposed to understanding, which avoids contradiction by 
transforming it into opposition or difference. This distinction, I argue, follows similarly 
to Lacan’s explanation of the masculine and feminine logics. 
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In Seminar XX: Encore, Lacan distinguishes between a masculine logic and a 
feminine logic. On the masculine side, he explains, the universal function implies the 
existence of an exception, or a limit (all X are submitted to the universal function F; 
there is at least one X that is not submitted to the universal function F). The 
masculine logic is one of a finite, limited universal, bearing upon the logic of the 
phallic master-signifier. The masculine logic is oriented to the phallus as the signifier 
of symbolic castration: the choice of the affirmative signifier that negates castration 
(and contradiction in being) as the lack that is the subject ($ in Lacanese). On the 
feminine side, a particular negation implies that there is no exception, there is no limit 
(not all X are submitted to the function F; there is no X that is not submitted to the 
function F), and in this sense, the feminine subject is capable of thinking the 
contradiction at the heart of being.  
Žižek helps to explain the logics of sexuation, and the distinction between the 
masculine and the feminine logics, by turning to two moments in Lacan’s 
interpretation of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum. Lacan, he explains, divides 
Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” into two different parts or moments: “I think” and “I 
am,” thought and being; and the subject’s entry into the Symbolic order is decided by 
a foundational forced choice. In Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psycho-Analysis, Lacan claims that the subject must choose thought and therefore 
loses being. However, a few years later, in Seminar XIV, The Logic of Fantasy, Lacan 
switches and claims that the subject is now condemned to the choice of being, and 
thought is then relegated to the position of the unconscious. Žižek’s proposal is to 
read these two different versions, not as mutually exclusive, but as two different ways 
of reading the logics of sexuation. The masculine subject, according to Žižek, is the 
one who chooses being, relegating thought to the position of the unconscious, 
whereas for the feminine subject, the choice is that of thought, therefore risking 
being.19 According to Alenka Zupančič, this means that “Woman” represents the 
exclusion/repression of the split or lack, or contradiction, as such.20 My own claim, 
therefore, is that the feminine logic correlates with reasoning in the Hegelian register, 
whereas the masculine logic coincides with that of understanding. As McGowan 
states explicitly, the actual situation of women in patriarchal society reveals that their 
existence itself is contradictory, and therefore women are able to think this 
contradiction (81).  
For the understanding, as McGowan explains, reality cannot be contradictory 
at an ontological level, even though we can identify contradictions through 
differences and oppositions at an epistemological level. But when we think beyond 
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the mere understanding of the world we become capable of grasping contradiction 
as what is: unlimited or infinite at an ontological level. Understanding avoids 
contradiction by confining itself to the realm of the possible. Understanding is limited, 
whereas reasoning is unlimited.  
Nevertheless, there is a logical priority to understanding since it is that which 
first forms and structures the world that reasoning subsequently thinks.21 It therefore 
establishes a synchronic conscious structure in which stability and comprehension 
are made possible and intelligible through the relation and differences between one 
signifier and the next. It is capable, in this way, of identifying logical and 
epistemological contradictions (or antinomies) through relations of difference and 
opposition. In this sense, too, the understanding is able to see how its own identity is 
dependent upon its difference from all other entities. It defines itself, like every 
signifier, through its difference from all of the others, and in this way bears a 
resemblance to the Lacanian logic of the signifier. The signifier (S1) may be read as 
that which defines the subject for another signifier (S2), but it is also the one (S1) for 
which all the others (S2), in their opposition, define the subject ($). Insofar as we 
remain caught in the epistemological field of the understanding – which remains 
stable and structured at the level of the synchronic (by which I mean the given and 
the fixed temporally) – we remain unable to think contradiction. By turning the “mass 
of data” into separate, comprehensible entities, building and establishing structures 
of knowledge (discourses, even, in the Foucauldian sense), the understanding fails to 
grasp contradiction, even though it still makes it evident. We could claim, in this 
sense, that the understanding is oriented towards the phallic signifier as the signifier 
of lack – the signifier of symbolic castration. It is the affirmation of the phallic signifier 
that cuts into the material world – the “mass of data” – and establishes difference. 
Thus, understanding assumes logical priority over reasoning to the extent that, as 
McGowan explains, “without the dividing power of the understanding, we would 
have no ability to thematize distinctiveness at all. We would instead confront a mass 
of data, in which differences would not be able to make a difference for us. The 
understanding’s act of separation is the fundamental basis for all thought, as Hegel 
sees it, and lays the groundwork for reason to grasp contradiction” (72). 
 
From the University Discourse to the Hysteric’s Discourse, and the Traversal of the 
Fantasy 
We could say, from a different Lacanian lens, that the movement from the 
understanding to reasoning is somewhat akin to the movement from the Lacanian 
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university discourse to the hysteric’s discourse. The university discourse formalizes 
knowledge, whereas the latter produces and thinks it through the act of questioning. 
Like the agent in the university discourse, understanding “enables the subject to 
recognize its own self-division, a self-division the subject cannot heal since it 
functions as the condition of the subject’s own possibility.” The movement towards 
the hysteric’s discourse (and the feminine logic in this sense, too) occurs when the 
subject recognizes that, even though it cannot heal its self-division, this self-division 
is emancipatory. This, according to McGowan, is what occurs with the move from 
understanding to reasoning (72-73). 
Reasoning is distinguished from understanding by the fact that it sees 
contradiction, not merely between itself and the other – although recognizing this 
difference is a first move in the direction of self-understanding and identity – but 
when it turns this identification inward towards the self. That is, when the 
epistemological contradiction is turned into an ontological one, when the subject 
recognizes that it is, itself, what it negates (63). In recognizing and thinking this self-
contradiction, the subject becomes capable of self-transformation and change. The 
difference between the human subject and the external, non-human object/being 
(and this is a place where I would want to in another space confront some of the 
claims made by vitalist new materialisms and monist posthumanisms, and object 
oriented ontologies), is that the former is capable through thinking of undermining 
the very basis for its own existence. As McGowan puts it, “for the subject, negation is 
not merely external. Subjects encounter contradiction through reason rather than 
existence. This is the source of the subject’s fundamental difference from the natural 
world. Nature exists in contradiction while the subject discovers contradiction within 
itself and ceases to confront negation as an externality” (65, emphasis added). When 
the subject recognizes this fact, it introduces otherness into itself, and ceases being 
what it is (or was). 
Regardless of whether the subject recognizes this split within itself, all 
subjectivity is still driven by this fundamental, ontological contradiction. Even though 
most subjects don’t avowedly embrace contradiction, we all, according to McGowan, 
unconsciously desire that which disrupts our own apparent self-interests (67). Desire, 
in fact, “emerges out of the subject’s failure to coincide with itself, its lack of self-
identity.” As McGowan explains, the desiring subject “is a contradictory being that 
wants to be other than it is” (77). Desire, is thus, the way that contradiction is 
assumed in the subject, even though for the most part the understanding disavows 
this fact and translates it or displaces it onto the mere difference from the other. By 
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doing so, we get the sense of how desire shapes our experience of the world. It is 
that which, by being included in the understanding as the externalization of 
contradiction onto mere difference, distorts the subject’s understanding of the world. 
This, too, is how we might come to regard sexual difference as an expression of the 
lack in being. Sexual difference is the way that desire as the experience of 
contradiction shapes our relationship to enjoyment into a difference of subjective 
positions. Reason, in contrast, “makes evident the extent to which the subject’s desire 
shapes the world that it apprehends” (75), and we might want to in this case 
consider how reasoning, as the apprehension of the contradiction, relates to the 
particularity of the sexual difference.  
Rather than creating a safe distance from desire, reason “involves the subject 
in what it perceives” (76). Reason allows the subject to recognize and apprehend 
desire as the form that contradiction assumes in itself (78). Desire, though, is still 
framed in the psychic register by fantasy, the most common of which is the fantasy 
of transcending contradiction. The fantasy of transcending contradiction is what 
drives the dialectic forward towards every new articulation of the contradiction, but 
the fantasy also blinds us to the fact that what we desire is really the contradiction 
itself. It is contradiction, according to McGowan, that “sustains the subject as 
desiring” (54). But reasoning is tied to what the psychoanalytic discourse refers to as 
the traversal of the fantasy.  
The subject traverses the fantasy when it comes to recognize (through 
reasoning) that satisfaction derives from the fantasy itself, rather than from what 
appears beyond it in the form of the resolution of the contradiction – that is, of 
obtaining the lost object that might bring an end to the search for a harmonious, 
completed whole of being. It’s when we’ve traversed the fantasy that we can begin to 
realize that contradiction is ontologically necessary. However, it is the very propulsion 
of desire – the fantasy to escape contradiction – that indeed leads us towards our 
freedom through the repetitious movement of negation. This is why Lacan’s motto, 
the ethic of not giving way on one’s desire, is in fact (perhaps counterintuitively) a 
step towards freedom. We can only think this through reasoning from the position of 
contradiction – the position of the infinite, of the unlimited, which is also why, 
returning to logics of sexuation, as Joan Copjec notes, for Lacan the ethical act is 
feminine (not-all).22 
Here, I want to pause and ask how the feminine position, as a particular 
articulation of reasoning, may be regarded in the context of the universal. Insofar as 
the feminine subject is the one most capable of recognizing contradiction in the 
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register of the phallic signifier, how do things fare when we come up against the 
much more universalizing dimension of global capitalism. The question here is 
whether patriarchy is closer to the universal than capitalism, or if it is instead the 
latter.23 In other words, insofar as our concern is with universal emancipation, are we 
in a situation in which patriarchy provides the material context to the universal, or 
instead does capitalism perform the universalizing operation. If the latter is true, we 
might need to graft onto the a more universalizing social symptom – the proletariat – 
the position of recognizing and apprehending the position of contradiction today. Or, 
perhaps, what we are encountering here is the contradiction between patriarchy and 
capitalism, since neither necessarily requires the other in order to function. Does this 
contradiction register at the level of the understanding, whereby we are intuiting a 
difference between the two, or can we grasp it in terms of the reasoning, in which 
case we might think the manner in which the contradiction between patriarchy and 
capitalism evinces the self-contradiction in each? Either way, it is in the fact of their 
symptoms that each indicates the presence of tyranny and the absence of universal 
emancipation in the other. I return to this point below. 
 
Freedom, Negation, and Resistance 
For Hegel, as McGowan explains, reasoning is the means through which we 
begin to think and internalize contradiction out of what appears to be an external 
opposition. Our ability to apprehend contradiction, and in so doing change and 
transform ourselves in the process of recognition, is a dimension that psychoanalysis 
and historical materialism share with Hegel’s dialectics.24 For all three, theory and 
interpretation precede transformative action. The ability to reason contradictions 
distinguishes human subjectivity from all other objects in the world; recognizing 
contradiction enables us to transform ourselves through negation. 
Hegel’s fundamental insight, which precedes Freud and psychoanalysis, is the 
fact that we seek out contradictions rather than retreating from them. In Lacanian 
terms, we could say that fantasy mediates our conscious desire to solve 
contradictions and our unconscious drive towards them. Apprehending contradiction 
through reason is thus, according to McGowan, what Hegel has in mind with his 
conception of freedom, and is very similar to the way that Lacan understood the 
traversal of the fantasy. Ideology, in contrast, obscures contradictions by 
transforming them into differences and oppositions, which are, as McGowan puts it, 
contradictions in disguise (13). This last fact is perhaps what puts the contradictions 
pertaining to the sexual difference at odds with those arising out of capitalism. I don’t 
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mean to suggest that the sexual difference is not in fact a contradictory relationship, 
but that the contradictions between the latter and global capitalism have to be 
assessed in their totality, at the level of the universal and the particular, rather than 
simply as mere difference or opposition. Ideology criticism, thus, pertains to our 
ability to recognize contradictions where they are presented as differences or 
oppositions. 
For me, one of the chief insights of McGowan’s book is his discussion, not only 
of contradiction in Hegel, but of the category of negation, as well as the idea of a self-
limitation with regards to the ethical agency of the subject. Nevertheless, it is first 
through the route of the reasoning that we can grasp the inevitability of contradiction. 
It is by thinking contradiction through reasoning that we begin to recognize freedom 
arising as the subject’s capacity to negate its own determinations. 
 We’ve seen so far how reasoning pertains to the subject’s capability to think 
the ontological presence and necessity of contradiction. While this is a path towards 
freedom, it is not in-itself freedom as such. For freedom to be actualized, we need to 
consider further what distinguishes human agency from the non-human. According 
to McGowan, it is the human subject’s capacity for negation that truly demonstrates 
the conditions of freedom. Freedom, he argues, “is unimaginable without negation” 
(154). The ability to negate the givens of its existence, whether they originate in 
biology or in culture, is that which provides the basis for the subject’s freedom. We 
may, in other words, be determined by forces external to ourselves, or by forces over 
which we have no a priori control. But we do have the capacity to negate these 
givens, these determinations, which is a sign of our freedom. To put it in the political 
register of the Marxist topography, we might say even that if the base determines the 
superstructure, the subject is capable of negating the base. The subject’s ability for 
self-determination therefore begins with negation. That being said, as McGowan 
rightly points out, “as long as one negates [only] an external authority, one remains 
on that authority’s terrain rather than one’s own” (153). A freedom that manifests itself 
only as resistance, in other words, is no freedom at all (155). Authentic (true) freedom 
is only discovered when one no longer has any external authorities left to transgress 
(172). In this sense, freedom consists, not merely through the negation of an external 
oppositional force, but in apprehending the fact that the subject provides the 
grounds for its own freedom (164). This is how a subject in-itself becomes a subject 
for-itself. 
 Evidence for McGowan’s claim about the politics of resistance abounds in our 
postmodern culture. Today, it almost appears as though resistance is itself part of the 
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dominant ideology. This is a dimension that often confuses, as Žižek sometimes puts 
it, the ruling ideology with the ideas that seem to rule. The problem with rebellion, as 
McGowan, notes, is that it is always positioned in opposition against some 
substantial other. Rebellion as the ruling ideology requires then the creation and the 
erection, the propping up, of some figure of a substantial other, or enemy.25 The 
current debates between the postmodern Left and the alt-Right is demonstrative.  
On the one hand, the postmodern Left is constantly at odds with the 
oppressive orders of white supremacy, misogyny, and trans- and homophobia. 
Articulated as identity politics, the Left appears to reconcile itself in the terms of 
modern liberalism along the lines of pride and expressiveness of one’s identity. But 
this contrasts starkly, on the other hand, with the postmodern Right, or the alt-Right, 
to the extent that the latter finds the Left perspective hypocritical insofar as they 
appear to permit the expression of all identities, save for the white, cis-
heteronormative, masculine identity. While the Left resists the forces of white 
supremacy and Eurocentrism, sexism, and trans- and homophobia, seeing these as 
expressions of the dominant ideology, the Right resists the forces of the Left, 
propping it up as the dominant discourse today. In both cases, the subjects of the 
Left and Right are interpellated as subjects of resistance, as subjects of rebellion. 
Both, too, are propelled by the capitalist and modernist revolutionary mottos of crisis 
and resistance, in which the need to discover the new is itself a constant force of 
rebellion and negation. So, when it comes to thinking the emancipatory role of 
negation, we have to be very careful, as McGowan reminds us, not to take mere 
negation as the sole import for freedom and universal emancipation. It is the 
universal dimension of negation, freedom, and emancipation, that we need to 
apprehend. 
 As McGowan explains, “Hegel’s conception of freedom begins with negation, 
but it ends with the recognition that this negation must manifest itself in some 
positive form if the subject is to free itself completely from the external authority that it 
negates” (155). Freedom is discovered, not through a single negation, but from a 
series of negations. This is why the Lacanian motto, do not give way to your desire, is 
an ethical position. It drives further the process of negation. But at a certain point in 
this process, the subject, through reasoning, has to recognize the inevitability of 
contradiction and therefore ground this apprehension in some positive form.  
The two forms that McGowan has in mind in his reading of Hegel are love and 
the state, and it is his developments of these lines in Hegel that mark his own 
contribution to a contemporary Hegelian theory of emancipation. As we’ll see, both 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






are central to an emancipatory ethics, and both are grounds for a reasoning capable 
of apprehending contradiction. But the difficulty with both is that they each have the 
potential either to merely justify that which already exists, or to justify past historical 
and contemporary atrocities. Since love, first, is read through Christianity in Hegel, it 
is difficult to avoid the historical role that this notion of love has played in European 
colonialism and imperialism, not to mention the order of the moral majority of the 
American neoconservatism. Second, with the state, as the Marxists have shown, on 
the one hand, through the notion of the class state, and as liberals and neoliberals, 
and Hayekians, and Randians, libertarians, even anarchists, and all sorts of other 
anti-Communists have argued, on the other hand, the overbearing power of the state 
is certainly a concern worth raising. So, what then permits us to see (Christian) love 
and the state as potentially emancipatory? Here, it’s Hegel’s rendering of the 
universal that, according to McGowan, turns the screw. 
 
Part Two: Towards a Theory of Universal Emancipation Today 
The Universal Singular Beyond the Particular 
The difficulty with a politics of resistance or rebellion is that it doesn’t 
necessarily indicate or explicate the universal dimensions of inequality, and as we 
have seen is fully capable of resigning itself towards a relativism of oppression. 
Inequality, according to McGowan, “has its basis in the reduction of contradiction to 
difference” (82), and even in the terms of the binary opposition as it is deployed 
culturally and politically we can see where this is the case. As Structuralist and post-
Structuralist thinkers, like Jacques Derrida, have shown, the problem with the binary 
opposition, as an expression of cultural difference, is that one of the terms in the 
binary always assumes a position of privilege. But that privilege is imposed as an 
effect of power and inequality, and does in this way manifest itself as the ideological. 
A common example, one that I’ve already addressed, is that between the masculine 
and the feminine.  
In a phallocentric society, the masculine – or the phallic signifier – appears to 
have such a privilege, and it is difficult to deny that our own culture is one that is 
sexist, not merely at the cultural level, but significantly, too, at an institutional one, 
which is why something like the #MeToo movement resonates quite well as it has 
moved from identifying an institutional phallocentrism and into a more interpersonal 
and cultural one. When we regard binary oppositions in this way, we see them as 
expressions of a difference between two positive, substantial, yet opposed entities. 
But when we conceive the binary as a contradiction between affirmation and 
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negation, we are far more capable of discerning the contradiction underlying the 
difference. As Fredric Jameson often identifies with his use of the Greimasian 
semiotic square, a term in a binary is often generally opposed, not merely by some 
other positive entity or other that expresses its complement, but by that more 
negative side of what a thing is not.  
The language of the digital is suggestive here since it allows us to see the 
binary opposition in terms of the relationship between positive and negative terms, 
between 1 and 0,26 which I’d equate in the Lacanian register with the difference 
between that master-signifier (S1) and the subject as split or lacking ($): 
positive/negative, affirmation/negation. When we read this into the sexual difference, 
we may come to understand how the position of negation, contained within the 
position of the feminine, is an expression rather of the ontological contradiction itself, 
as the means through which the symptom of the total system of sexuation is 
articulated and thought, by the way that the feminine even, in its position of the non-
all, evinces the very lack in masculinity (the non-masculine that contradicts the 
masculine). The position of woman is that which is most capable of reasoning and 
apprehending contradiction because of the very position of women as the social 
symptom of patriarchy, the complement that identifies the lack in the masculine. In 
the context of a patriarchal society, the feminine subject position is the one capable 
of discovering the contradiction, realizing that it is actual and knowable through 
reason, creating the conditions of possibility for the elimination of inequality. The 
same, of course, can be said about the racialized subject in the context of European 
colonialism, which may too be why Hegel found so significant the Haitian revolution 
that followed the French.27 The #BlackLivesMatter movement, too, is evidence of this 
in the register of racial difference.28 But what complicates such oppositions and 
differences further is their articulation with regards to, or as present within, the 
context of the universal. 
 McGowan notes that every action implies the invocation of the universal. 
Whether this is done overtly or explicitly, or not, is of little importance since the 
universal is always implicitly the setting against which any action takes place. The 
universal is, in other words, the background to every particularity, which can only 
assert itself in relation to the universal (even in the abstract). This is why, as 
McGowan claims, every assertion towards particularity inherently invokes – whether 
knowingly or not – the universal. This is the situation, for instance, in the case of the 
already mentioned postmodern (liberal) Left, which attempts to champion every 
particular identity, asserting to each its own individual authenticity, while throwing 
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coal at any and every assertion towards universality, which has come to be seen as 
overly oppressive (or at the very least, anti-democratic) in the same way that 
Foucault charged the Marxian language of the false consciousness in the ideological 
as implicitly championing a hierarchical position of truth. How can one, for instance, 
be allowed to speak universally for or in the place of the other? Here, every particular 
difference is justified in the name of an anti-universalist approach, but in its very 
opposition to the universal it inevitably props it up, regardless. Every anti-normative 
position, in other words, inherently props up its own norm; or, at least, every critique 
of a norm is itself the imposition of a new one. The universal, we see, still persists as 
the background against which the particular is articulated. The same is true of the 
Right nationalist project. 
 Nationalism and the projects of the national states are, too, examples of a turn 
towards the particular. As I’ve already noted above, an inherent xenophobia is the 
product of the particularity of the national consciousness. This already, as Benedict 
Anderson notes in his conception of the “imaginary community” is one of the limiting 
dimensions at play in the formation of the nation as a defined identity.29 But through 
the exclusionary practice of the production of the national consciousness, the 
limitations of the nation cannot but be defined by the universalization of the foreign 
other, who is excluded on the grounds of its difference. In both cases, the Left and 
the Right, the postmodernist and the nationalist, the turn towards an identity of 
difference is a project that bypasses the universal in order to articulate the particular.  
Particularism is, as McGowan claims, a fundamentally conservative 
philosophy. As he contends, the product of bypassing the universal in this way 
cannot but be the reproduction of inequality. Inequality, he argues, “has its basis in 
the rejection of universality and the celebration of particular difference. Once one 
abandons the universal for the sake of the particular, one abandons the very terrain 
on which one might convince others to support one’s political program” (192). It’s in 
this way that the turn to particularity can only reproduce inequality through the 
translation of contradiction into difference or opposition. In contrast, a turn towards 
the universal is the manner through which each may see in the other a shared 
relationship of alienation. Shared alienation, as McGowan puts it, is the basis for a 
shared bond that exists (198). The way to locate and articulate this shared bond of 
alienation requires, sacrificing “particularity on the altar of universality” (184). This, 
according to McGowan, is “the only path to an authentic singularity” (Ibid). Arriving at 
an authentic singularity – that is, the full expression of the ontological necessity of 
contradiction – comes by way of the universal. By following the universal, and seeing 
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things in their totality, we become capable of discovering the singularity as the point 
of expression – that is, as the social symptom – of the universal system. 
 Put differently, the whole, as McGowan explains, always as a hole. No social 
whole, he explains, “can achieve a perfect self-identity in which every part has its 
proper place” (186). The failure to assign every part its proper place is expressed as 
the singularity, as the social symptom. The universal singular expresses the limits of 
the social, and in this sense overlaps with the Lacanian conception of the Real. When 
Marx reads capitalism as a totality, for instance, he does so by examining it in totality, 
but also as a universal, global system. The global dimensions of capitalism, as a 
universal system, are much clearer for us today, in twenty-first century capitalism, in 
the era of globalization, than they were in Marx’s day. Nevertheless, Marx’s foresight 
was in seeing the expansionary dimensions of the capitalist mode of production, 
needing to grow as a by-product of its imperative towards profit maximization. 
Capitalism is a universal system, too, because of its ability to dissolve all local and 
regional particularities, subsuming them into itself. Regardless of local social, cultural, 
and political particularities, capitalism is still capable of operating as a global system. 
It therefore presents itself as the universal background against which all other 
struggles and contradictions position themselves, and are dissolved, absorbed, or 
subsumed. It is, of course, also, by reading capitalism as a universal system, that we 
find a path towards the singularity of the proletariat subject as an expression of the 
system’s own internal limitations and contradictions. It’s with this in mind that we can 
again look at the difference proposed between the universal dimensions of the 
proletariat subject and the feminine subject, and perhaps still see them not as 
difference but as contradiction, insofar as the feminine remains particular, whereas 
the proletariat, set in the historical context of global capitalism, expresses the 
universal singular.30 Nevertheless, there is nothing about the presence of the universal 
singular that suggests that an emancipatory consciousness is yet present. In the 
older Hegelian-Marxist language, we have not yet seen the transition from the in-
itself to the for-itself of the proletariat.  
It is oddly the case that movements such as #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter 
are much more conscientious of and articulate about their own positions of 
exploitation and oppression; whereas the working class today appears much more 
aligned towards the nationalist projects of the alt-Right. We might read this difference 
not as a cultural antagonism, but even as a contradiction present within the 
proletariat class consciousness itself, with each articulation expressing something 
opposed in each different expression of the class struggle: through sexism, racism, 
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and nationalism. What we see, then, is that even the universal singular today is 
expressed as difference and opposition between these different positions of 
exploitation, oppression, and inequality; and what we can say is simply this: that their 
articulation in this way, is perhaps the highest form of the ideology of twenty-first 
century capitalism. The conundrum that is here expressed, is the same as the one 
faced by the entire history of Western Marxism, beginning with Lukács and Gramsci, 
which has asked the very simple question of why the exploited continue to resist the 
very language of their liberation and insist on remaining caught within the terms that 
set out their domination. It is here that perhaps the novelty of McGowan’s re-reading 
of Hegel is most welcomed. 
 
Love, Transference, and the Party 
McGowan’s primary contribution is to read Hegel’s universalism through a return to 
his categories of love and the state. I will deal with the former in this and the next 
section, and look at the latter in the following one. It is first important to note that it is 
via his focus on the question of love that McGowan identifies the intersubjective, as 
opposed to the individual dimensions of emancipatory self-consciousness.  
Individualism, as a founding principle of liberalism, is an indication of its 
primary limitations. It’s a principle that Althusser identifies in his theory of subjectivity, 
which read in its larger context shows that the state apparatus interpellates 
individuals through the form of the law, in which the subject is the agent of contract 
and exchange.31 This is why, in his theory of ideology, Althusser claims that 
individuals are interpellated as subjects. It’s also, perhaps why his theory of the state 
and the law is one that makes ideology work, whereas, as we’ll see for McGowan, in 
his reading of Hegel, law and the state can be an arm towards emancipation. This 
may even be seen if we turn from the Althusserian register to the Lacanian one.  
As Mladen Dolar notes, the difference between the Althusserian conception of 
the subject and the Lacanian subject concerns the fact that subject for Althusser is 
what makes ideology work, whereas for Lacan subject emerges where ideology 
fails.32 As both Jodi Dean and I have argued, this suggests that the terms in 
Althusser’s formula should be reversed. It’s not that ideology interpellates individuals 
as subjects, but that ideology interpellates subjects as individuals.33 This, even, is 
what Althusser shows as evidentiary in Freud and Marx, insofar as both trouble the 
bourgeois conception of the individual consciousness.34 In both the liberal, as well as 
the neoliberal discourse, the key agent is the individual as owner and bearer of 
values exchangeable in the market. But in both the form of the analytical discourse 
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and in the Marxist party form we see much more clearly the fact that people cannot 
act as pure individuals. This is what McGowan finds, as well, in Hegel’s writing on 
Christianity. 
 The intersubjective dimension of love is missed by most Left Hegelians, 
according to McGowan, because they tend to bypass Hegel’s writing on Christianity. 
For Hegel, according to McGowan, Christianity is a religion of love, and it is through 
his approach to the form of love that Hegel most fully develops his philosophy of 
reason. Hegel’s reading of love through Christianity is comparable, even, in the way 
that McGowan reads him, to the form of intersubjectivity found in the analytical 
discourse. Recognizing contradiction, according to McGowan, “requires not just the 
attentiveness of the psychoanalyst but (at the very least) the presence of an 
interlocutor to the manifestation of the subject’s unconscious. Thinking by oneself, 
one is guaranteed to miss it” (55). What love shares with the analytical discourse is 
thus the form of the transference, which involves a dimension of trust in the 
interlocutor that allows them to be a recipient of the manifestations of the subject’s 
unconscious. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on transference, love comes at the 
beginning of the analytic practice. The problem of love, he says, “interests us insofar 
as it allows us to understand what happens in transference – and, to a certain extent, 
because of transference.”35 
Love, according to McGowan, “represents the identification of contraries and 
the sustaining of contradiction as a positive force. When one is in love, one unites 
one’s own identity with that of the other. The lover and the beloved become one in 
their way of finding satisfaction over their own by adopting the other’s satisfaction as 
their own” (99). Love, in other words, enables the subject to translate difference into 
contradiction. It “provides the avenue for granting contradiction a privileged 
ontological position” (99). Reason, just like the transference in the analytic discourse, 
models itself on love and takes its place once we become aware of this. Love and 
reason provide the terrain for apprehending difference as contradiction, and 
therefore of discovering the split within oneself. As McGowan puts it, “In love, the 
subject identifies itself with the other’s difference, but this identification does not 
eliminate the difference. It creates a disturbance in the subject’s identity that 
transforms that identity, revealing that identity is never isolated. Love is possible 
because the relation to difference is already part of every identity even before the 
subject falls in love. But love makes this difference explicit” (112). Both love and the 
analytical discourse grasp the centrality of contradiction, not through a relation 
between the differences, but through the recognition that there is, what Žižek refers 
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to as a “non-relation.”36 Both love and reason are what help, in this way, to move the 
subject from the hysteric’s discourse to that of the analyst through the transference. 
But considering this in the register of an emancipatory movement, we might be 
wondering what form love can take for the manifestation of this project into some 
positive force. Turning towards the political, Jodi Dean argues that it’s on this level 
that we can rethink the form of the Communist party. 
Dean has been, perhaps, the most vocal of the Lacanian political thinkers to 
articulate a psychoanalytic theory of the Leninist party. As she puts it, in Lacanian 
terms, the party is “an organization situated at the overlap of two lacks,” that of the 
other and that of the subject, a point that mirrors the discourse on love.37 The party 
becomes a positive manifestation of this lack, creating a vehicle through which, she 
says, subjects can express a collective will. The party, Dean writes, “doesn’t resolve 
contradictions; it expresses them as contradictions.”38 We find, in other words, strong 
similarities between her conception of the Communist party, and McGowan’s theory 
of love as the model for an emancipatory form of reasoning. But one of the questions 
that emerges, as McGowan observes, whenever we invoke Communism as the 
signifier of political practice following the traumas of the twentieth century (and 
present day Communism, for instance, in the People’s Republic of China, or even in 
Latin American Socialism) is how we might distill the difference between a party 
form in which subjects enact their own self-limitation as the force of freedom, and 
that of an oppressive party mechanism, in which limits are imposed externally by 
some substantial other (i.e., one that does not perceive itself to be lacking, such as 
the Stalinist dictator)? What makes the party form in Dean’s sense any different from 
the tyrannical or oppressive form found in actually existing Communism or 
Socialism? 
I agree, on the one hand, with Dean’s claim that any positive political force in 
conditions of contemporary capitalism requires something like a party form, and I 
also agree that the party form is one that has the potential to be modelled on the 
psychoanalytic form of the analyst’s discourse, as well as the form of love that 
McGowan finds in Hegel’s reading of Christianity, and particularly the relationship 
between the form of love as that which, through reasoning, brings to self-
consciousness the fact of contradiction out of the ideological production of 
differences and oppositions. However, on the other hand, I agree with McGowan that 
in our present conditions it is still worth questioning the concept of Communism as a 
signifier of emancipation. According to him, love and the concept are Hegelian 
names “for the way that otherness disturbs identity” (101). Do we yet have a concept, 
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today, one that rivals Communism and that adequately allows us to think 
contradiction in a positive form; that is, as capable of realizing universal 
emancipation, not as a solution to contradiction, as McGowan desires, but as a point 
of formal freedom inscribed through the collective will towards self-limitation? This is 
a question I will continue to pursue. 
 
Learning to Love the Law (and Marriage) 
According to Dean, the Communist party form is distinguished from liberalism, 
populism, and democracy by the fact that it still perceives the people as a divided 
subject. She sees this, more so, in terms of the class struggle as a split in the people 
as a unified subject position.39 Class struggle, I agree, is certainly the form in which 
contradiction is inscribed into the social. This is how Žižek continues to approach 
Laclau and Mouffe’s claim that the social is split by antagonism.40 Class struggle is, for 
Žižek, the way in which the antagonism as the social real presents itself in the 
context of capitalist society. However, one question that we need to ask is how the 
division in the people – the class struggle as the form of the social contradiction – is 
reasoned by the subject. In other words, how does the class struggle move us from 
mere difference between capital and proletariat (as we find in many of the positivist 
sociological interpretations of class as socio-economic status) towards the 
contradiction between capital and proletariat? According to Dean, liberalism, 
populism, and democracy all assert unity, whereas communism asserts a gap, and 
the party is the positive form of presentation of this gap. But how, still, might we 
reason this form with regards to the freedom of the subjects in whose name it 
asserts itself? It’s here that I find McGowan somewhat more convincing with regards 
to his reading of Hegel’s theory of the state, which so far remains absent in Dean’s 
theory of Communism, at least to my knowledge. 
 Hegel, according to McGowan, sees in the state “a social structure that 
sustains contradiction.” The state, he writes, is “the political equivalent to absolute 
knowing” (202) just as love is the manner in which it is expressed at an 
intersubjective level, and reasoned in the way that the subject becomes capable of 
grasping contradiction at the level of thinking. The state is thus the positive 
embodiment of the subject’s freedom. It is the embodiment of the manifestation 
through which the subject’s own freedom is articulated in its own self-limitation, as 
opposed to an externally imposed limitation. The subject becomes free only when it 
gives itself the authority to obey the Law – not because of external force, but because 
of an internal resignation and limitation. Following the law out of self-authorization, 
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through one’s own self-limitation, is, according to McGowan, the highest form of 
freedom, just as one remains in love, not out of the control imposed externally by the 
marriage contract. Freedom in love is not the simple act of negating the marriage 
contract and following one’s desire to accumulate affairs. True free love is the 
recognition that the subject imposes a self-limitation towards affairs with others 
because there exists an awareness in the fact that the recognition returned from the 
lover is the very condition of the subject’s own apprehension of the split within itself. 
It is the very same form that both the party and the state need to express if they are to 
enact a positive representation of the subject’s freedom; they must come to embody 
the equal and universal dimensions of this freedom, where the freedom of each 
necessarily re-enforces the freedom of all. 
Freedom through the form of the state then depends on a law that we give to 
ourselves. (159). The question is whether the law is one’s own. If not, then it reasons 
to say that we must enact our freedom through its negation, just as falling out of love 
justifies the negation of the marriage. A substantial other in the form of a law that 
reproduces difference, opposition, and inequality is thus such an example of a 
threatening form of the state just as it represents an abusive marriage; and, the task 
of the Hegelian theorist, in this case, “is one of dismantling the forms that the 
substantial other takes on as they arise” (162) – that is, of criticizing an authority that 
assumes the appearance of a substantial, undivided entity – like a dictator or a bad 
husband, wife, or partner. 
 
Good and Bad States 
The state for Hegel is a positive manifestation of contradiction since it expresses the 
contradiction present within the society between public and private interests, and 
constantly confronts the subject with this contradiction. It creates the formal 
conditions for the subject’s freedom by separating it from its private concerns (202). 
The state, therefore, operates as a shared obstacle for the collective. It becomes a 
further embodiment of the collective form of the analyst’s discourse, which shares a 
discursive form that is similar to fetishism; however, in the state form we see the 
transposition of the obstacle into one that is the expression of contradiction rather 
than its indefinite negation and postponement. 
 According to McGowan, totalitarian and oppressive states arise either because 
they prop up a substantialized figure of external authority (like the dictator), or 
because of the fact that they confuse civil society for the state form itself, as is the 
case in liberalism. In civil society, subjects view themselves only as private 
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individuals, and the form of equality desired is one that seeks out merely the equality 
of private individuals. Authoritarian leaders try to create social harmony amongst the 
particularities of private individuals, rather than seeking universal emancipation. 
Social harmony remains ideological inasmuch as its project is one of eradicating 
contradiction. Universal emancipation, in contrast, requires something like the public 
form of the state to make contradiction apprehensible, and therefore to create the 
conditions of possibility for authentic freedom and equality. 
In liberalism and capitalism, civil society subordinates the state to its service. 
We see this even more clearly in neoliberalism where, far from dismantling the state 
mechanisms – as is often claimed by its proponents, who appear to desire less state 
and less government – they are used to further entrench the market fundamentalism 
of the neoliberal ideology, using state, government, and market incentives to 
encourage subjects to act increasingly as individuals in competition with each other 
over scarce resources. The difference between the liberal conception of the 
individual and the neoliberal one is found in the difference between an ideal based in 
equality and one based in competition. For liberals, the market is a space of equal 
exchange; for neoliberals, it is a space of competition. But in both formations, private 
self-interest is prioritized over the public good because civil society is prioritized over 
the state. 
Despite McGowan’s protestations to the contrary, Anna Kornbluh reminds us 
that in Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune, he too proposes a similar critique and 
expectation towards the form of the state. Marx’s point with regards to the position of 
the state is not that “there should be no organized institutions of social life, but rather 
that those institutions should be infrastructures in the service of social life.”41 Kornbluh 
cites Marx, from his Critique of the Gotha Program, who writes that, freedom 
“consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one 
completely subordinated to it.”42 As she puts it elsewhere (and in a formula that I 
cannot help but support completely), “We are everywhere, right and left, exhorted to 
oppose and transcend the state. But the materialism of the signifier, the formalism of 
the political, offer a counter to this orthodoxy, a path to embracing the state as a limit, 
embracing the space of the political as the only and proper sphere of life (and 
death), a path to embracing limits as the condition of freedom.”43 It is difficult, here, 
not to see a resemblance to McGowan’s own use of Hegel to argue for the state 
form, which subordinates the private self-interest of individuals to the public good. Or, 
to be more precise, the state form is subordinated to the public good, which is a 
condition for the universal emancipation of all.  
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As McGowan puts it, whereas civil society encourages people to put self-
interest first, “the state demands that the subject recognize itself first and foremost as 
a public being” (205). The state, for most people today, appears as an oppressive 
oppositional force, either because of its penchant towards an artificial social 
harmony – one that necessarily relies upon the exclusion of an other, into whom the 
universal is displaced, especially in the form of the nation state – or because it 
transforms the state into an arm of civil society. Fascism, too, turns contradiction into 
opposition, and is often the result of democratic attempts to repress contradiction. 
Fascism, as McGowan argues, is the result of subjects seeking out contradictions 
that democracy tries to repress. Fascism is in this way a by-product of democracy’s 
attempt to create equality out of social harmony, and therefore is required to repress 
contradiction and the inherent inequalities of capitalism in order to preserve itself. 
Yet, just like liberal democracy, fascism, too, attempts to create an image of social 
harmony through the repression of contradiction, via a reified friend/enemy 
dichotomy (209). Fascism is in this sense an inauthentic revolution, whereas 
Communist totalitarianism is the perversion of an authentic one. Instead of seeking 
to produce a social harmony of individuals, McGowan claims that giving priority to 
the state makes us public individuals before we are private ones (206). That being 
said, it is perhaps too optimistic simply to propose this model without giving it a 
concrete expression. This is where we need, finally, to debate the proper historical 
concept that can give positivity to McGowan’s theory of universal emancipation. This 
is where, for me, it is still necessary to be an historical materialist. 
 
From the Historical to the Actual Concept 
Philosophy, according to Hegel, has limited political force. It has, for McGowan, less 
an ability to imagine alternative futures than to recognize and interpret existing 
structures. But in reading existing structures in their totality, that is by reading them 
through the passage of the universal, we need to ask if it becomes possible to 
propose an alternate future. A telos as opposed to a teleology. According to 
McGowan, we may do so, but only within the terms available to us in the present, 
given to us by the prevailing symbolic structure of society (210). For Hegel, 
“philosophy intervenes politically by making clear the relations that already exist.” By 
doing this, showing the social relations that already exist, philosophy identifies what 
doesn’t fit. It identifies the symptom “that expresses the contradiction of the epoch” 
(210). The piece that doesn’t fit is that which undermines the system. We discover the 
piece that doesn’t fit through interpretation, rather than by fantasizing about a 
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solution to contradiction (210). This, according to McGowan, is what Marx proposes. 
He provides a fantasy for overcoming contradiction, rather than one of how to 
sustain contradiction. Here, though, I wonder if this is not precisely what Marx had in 
mind with the concept of Communism, about which, as many commentators note, 
he had very little to say on the practical level. Is it not perhaps the case that 
Communism operated for Marx as an emancipatory concept in the Hegelian sense? 
Or is it truly the case the Communism presents us with the teleology offered by the 
dialectical materialism of the late Engels or Stalin? 
My own view is that Marx’s materialist turn looks at how changes in the human 
society stem from the struggle for access to basic needs rather than abstract ideals 
of freedom. According to McGowan, Marx’s translation of Hegel’s philosophy of 
contradiction into historical materialism betrays Hegel’s revolutionary program. For 
McGowan, Marx therefore represents a Rightist deviation from Hegel since he 
abandons the centrality of contradiction. Emancipation occurs through contradiction, 
not as a result of overcoming it. But what if it is just such the case that in Marx there 
is, like in Hegel, a progressive movement not towards a resolution of contradiction 
absolutely, but beyond a particular contradiction and towards, as McGowan puts it, 
more intractable ones (212)? 
 Žižek makes this case somewhat similarly when he argues in The Ticklish 
Subject for a return to the primacy of the critique of political economy, “not to the 
detriment of the issues raised by postmodern forms of politicization, but precisely in 
order to create the conditions for the more effective realization of feminist, ecological, 
and so on demands.”44 More recently, he writes likewise, that “the way to think the 
singular universality of the emancipatory subject as objectively and materially 
determined is through a negative gesture: of negating capitalism as a substantive 
determination.”45 I read these statements in the tradition of historical materialism to 
indicate the need to negate the existing structures of inequality in order to more 
adequately address the repressed traumas of the dominant ideology, including its 
own inability to contend with its own sexism and racism (for instance) despite its 
apparent penchant for formal equality. 
 Global capitalism has achieved universality by negating all other external 
obstacles and barriers to its expansion. The same is true somewhat of technology – if 
we read it in another register, that of the Anthropocene – which has encompassed 
the earth, to the extent that nature has at this point been entirely subsumed by 
technology and the artificial. This is why, perhaps, Jameson sees the postmodern 
sublime as one that enacts a paranoia about technology rather than nature. But now 
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that the real subsumption, not merely formal subsumption, of capitalism has 
engulfed the planet and dissolved all previous particularities – now we are left only 
with the internal limits of the system rather than external obstacles. As Žižek puts it, 
“when reality reaches its notion, this notion itself has to be transformed.”46 As 
capitalism has subsumed all of its external limits, it now turns inwards, towards 
implosion. The question is thus not will capitalism end? The question, instead, is 
what will come next. There is nothing to guarantee the progression of history 
towards an emancipated society (a teleology), and as things currently stand it 
appears as though we can expect a deeper move towards authoritarianism and 
global inequality, set against the background of changing environmental conditions 
due to climate change. As someone once put it, though, the Earth will go on just fine; 
it’s human beings that we need to worry about. What concept then is adequate to 
the realization of the project of universal emancipation that McGowan has in mind, 
but set within our own historical conditions? 
The concept for Hegel, as McGowan explains, is a way of interpreting and 
reasoning contradiction. McGowan rightly states that the historical concept is only 
knowable in the total interpretation of what exists. Viewed in our historical totality, 
which concepts, then, are currently on offer to this task?47 What are the terms that we 
currently have on order? Democracy? Communism? Socialism? Liberalism? 
Conservatism? What about Democratic Socialism? 
Hegel’s radicality, as we see through McGowan’s interpretation, can come 
only after the collapse of liberalism and capitalism, as well as after the experience of 
actually existing Communism. We have seen already the contradictions implicit in 
liberalism and conservatism. Posthumanisms ignore the ethical distinctiveness of the 
human subject. Movements like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter, although they 
express a singular universality within the context of phallocentrism, Eurocentrism, 
and nationalism, are not in themselves universal struggles at a global level. 
Furthermore, the existing liberal order is everywhere ready to support the demands 
of women, racialized minorities, and members of the LGBTQ+ communities for 
greater equality. We see even a strong liberalism at the heart of corporate and 
technological giants, like Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google, (the so-
called FAANG companies). Everywhere already, it appears that liberal capitalism is a 
champion of equality. What it fails to see, still, is the inability of liberalism to build 
universal equality due to its inherent need for inequality in the capitalist mode of 
production. This is one reason why the new Right identifies these other struggles 
with liberalism and the power of capitalism. This has been one of the chief reasons 
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for the call towards Communism on the Left. But the trouble with Communism as a 
concept is the historical baggage that it still carries; and it appears as though no 
amount of discussion over “authentic” communism, or “true” communism, will suffice 
to persuade the people in this direction. The debate over the differences between 
Communism and Socialism, voiced through figures such as Antonio Negri, Alain 
Badiou, and Žižek, are inconsequential, as well, since, at least in the West, their 
individual meanings through Cold War propaganda have been irredeemably 
combined, and efforts to separate the two falls on deaf ears at the level of the 
average person. What concept, then, are we left with?  
 
Epilogue: Democratic Socialism – An Historical Concept for Universal Emancipation 
I want to propose in conclusion that Democratic Socialism carries this potential 
today, both to express and reason the contradictions between the universality of 
public service, the particularity of individual private interest, and the singularity of the 
subject. We should take notice, for instance, of the way that a proponent of 
Democratic Socialism, like Bernie Sanders in the U.S., applies the kind of 
emancipatory logic that McGowan ascribes to Hegel. He is neither presented as a 
substantial figurehead – we see this, for instance, in his campaign slogan, “Not Me, 
Us” – nor does he ever attempt to reason Democratic Socialism as a solution, an end 
to contradiction, but articulates its necessity with reference to the contradictions of 
capitalism, as when he states, for instance, that he does not believe that the few in 
the “billionaire class” should have so much, when “so many have so little.” When 
asked how he defines Democratic Socialism, Sanders asserts his belief in the fact 
that people should not be working more than forty hours a week and not have the 
ability to pay for basic necessities. His articulation of Democratic Socialism is not one 
that proposes a fully concrete resolution, but rather makes explicit and reasons the 
contradictions that currently exist. His program for Democratic Socialism is one that 
offers rhetorically a manner of reasoning and expression of the contradictions of 
capitalism. Congresswoman, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, likewise a representative of 
the Democratic Socialist movement, has been a leading figure in the fight for a 
Green New Deal that rightly identifies the overlap between the contradictions of 
capitalism and those of the environment and climate change. The Green New Deal 
exemplifies the kind of positive program that identifies existing contradictions and 
reasons them in their practical and universal materiality. 
While many may argue that Democratic Socialism is not itself dialectical, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that any dialectical materialist worthy of the name 
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should be able to see it as a concept capable of realizing the freedom in 
contradiction that McGowan proposes in his study on Hegel. As Žižek suggests, we 
should not aim to completely eradicate all contradictions, but we may pursue the 
negation of those forces that repress freedom and universal emancipation. 
Democratic Socialism may not be a complete solution to the problems of sexism, 
racism, climate change, or even capitalism entirely. But it is today the formation of 
our common sense (or our sense of the commons). All things being equal, I, for one, 
would much rather fight against capitalism (not to mention fight against sexism, 
racism, and trans-/homophobia) in the conditions of Democratic Socialism than in 
our present conditions of neoliberalism verging ever further towards a new 
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